Previous generations, by contrast, thought of the law differently: they believed that the content of our laws was determined by factors that were beyond our control. This idea is most evident in the theory of "natural law," which dominated legal minds for millennia, and which maintained that human laws were determined by the very nature of our universe: "True law," said Cicero in the first century B.C., is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting …. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people .… But these "non-instrumental" conceptions have by and large passed from the world. We have come to reject the idea that the content of the law is somehow fixed by a divine arrangement or "incontrovertible reason" discovered by priests or jurists: we feel free to mold our law as we see fit, largely emancipated from the shackles of religious authority and tradition.
Hence our "instrumental" conception of law -our belief that the law is for us to shape in the pursuit of our chosen goals and interests. As Tamanaha puts it, we see "law as a means to an all are manifestations of a dangerous instrumental ideology that poses a serious threat to the Rule of Law.
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To this strong thesis Tamanaha adds two qualifications: first, he is "not advocating a return to former non-instrumental understandings of law, which appears impossible"; 20 and second, he does not think that the damage to our Rule of Law is irreversible: instrumentalism may inflict such damage, and indeed tends to do so, but history may ultimately show we have managed to contain it -the final impact of instrumentalism is yet to be seen. 21 These are substantial qualifications, but Tamanaha's thesis still stands: legal consciousness underwent a profound shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental conception of law, and that shift is threatening the Rule of Law in its manifold manifestations -from legislation, to the conduct of the professional Bar, to the decision-making of judges.
What is the nature of that threat? Tamanaha claims -in fact this is more an assumption than a claim, since Tamanaha never seeks to defend it -that the Rule of Law requires that the law aim exclusively at the "common good." The instrumental conception of law, says Tamanaha, weakens this important principle -with the result that statutes aimed at benefiting factional but powerful interests (rather than society as a whole) are proliferating, while more and more lawyers are willing to engage in specious arguments and even in criminal fraud on their clients' behalf. Moreover, the instrumental conception of law encourages a form of legal interpretation that shows little respect for the binding nature of legal rules, and that therefore undermines the certainty and objectivity required by the Rule of Law.
As we shall soon see, there are serious flaws in this thesis. The following analysis is divided into three sections discussing legislation, legal advocacy, and adjudication. A fourth section examines Tamanaha's dispute with his alleged chief ideological nemesis -Richard
Posner's brand of legal pragmatism.
I LEGISLATION
The instrumentalist conception of law, says Tamanaha, produces improper legislative outcomes. 22 The "critical difference" between the non-instrumental take on legislation and the instrumental one involves "shifts in views about 'public interest.'" 23 Thinkers as diverse as
Plato, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, and the Founding Fathers all believed that any legitimate law must aim at advancing the "common good," rather than the interests of any narrow faction. 24 Indeed fears that powerful factions would control the legislative agenda were a constant theme in early American political thought, and some early American courts went so far as invalidating legislation for failing to promote "the general welfare of the people." 25 By contrast, says Tamanaha, the instrumentalist conception of law snubs this important principle, with the result that legislation benefiting special interests is proliferating. 26 Tamanaha recognizes that insisting on the "common good" as the only proper aim of the law may have sounded more reasonable in the distant and far more homogeneous societies of especially then -the idea has often been misused: "Two centuries ago and before," says Tamanaha, "law inured to the benefit of the powerful and was often draconian and intolerant of dissent ….
[T]his was to some degree a result of enforced homogeneity in the socio-legal order which suppressed or eliminated contrary groups, granting them little or no recognition within the law."
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The aptness of Tamanaha's concession is confirmed by a quick reflection on the legal status of, say, women and minorities during those periods. Indeed it is worth remembering that the U.S. Supreme Court's Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld the criminal conviction of a black man for sitting in a "whites only" train coach, explained its decision by stating that the relevant statute was "enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good." 29 That the "common good" is the only proper end of the law is a vacuous principle if those who make the law also believe, like Louis XIV, that "L'Etat -c'est moi" so that the "common good" is what's good for them. And if the only proper object of the law is a "common good" it may become difficult to advance the legal interests of under-represented or heretical groups -and easy to trample them.
On a more philosophical level, the claim that we all share a "common good" -a
Rousseauian "general will" to which we all do, or should, subscribe -has been the subject of growing skepticism from two related directions. First, some have turned skeptical as to whether there is in fact a single "common good" of which we can all speak, rather than many competing and potentially contradictory ones. 30 give-and-take among competing interest groups that, for "interest group pluralism," constitutes the heart of a legitimate legislative outcome.
There is another problem with Tamanaha's thesis. Tamanaha may not be alone in claiming that laws must aim exclusively at the "common good," and that the modern age has seen a weakening of this principle (although, as already mentioned, he does not defend that position); 35 but his claim that this has been the result of a shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental conception of law is quite novel. Yet, why would a shift to an instrumental conception of law (that sees law as a means to an end) weaken the belief that the "common good" is the only proper end of the law? Tamanaha never says why. But in fact, the most natural reading of the relation between the two is precisely the reverse: skepticism towards the "common good" ideal seemed to have led to the shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental conception of law. When belief in social and moral universal truths collapsed, casting doubt on the notion of an authoritative "common good," it became impossible to hold on to the view that the law was an immutable embodiment of divine justice. (Natural law theory -the paradigmatic non-instrumental conception of law -began to die when belief in universal moral truths collapsed.
36 ) The next obvious step would be to view the law as a means to ever-changing ends.
Thus, Tamanaha's alleged threat to the Rule of Law -i.e., the decline in the legal ideal of the "common good" -lies deeper than, and prior to, any shift in legal consciousness -in the shift to the spirit of modernity itself; 37 which means, in turn, that Tamanaha Tamanaha's answer, as in the case of legislation, has to do with the idea of the "common good." "Non-instrumental" lawyers, says Tamanaha, recognize the "dualistic ideal of the legal profession," which has always been concerned with both "the client's interests and the public good."
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Law is essential to social order and justice: it requires specialized knowledge that only lawyers possess; the public needs lawyers to facilitate their intercourse with one another, and to protect them from harm by others and from government; lawyers have a special role in the state as guardians of the legal order.
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A "non-instrumental" lawyer is a lawyer fully cognizant of her public role and the duties attached to it.
Tamanaha believes that this vision, and its attendant ethical obligations, is being torn to pieces by the "instrumental" conception of law: whereas the "version of the lawyer ideal as promoter of the common good once had salience within the legal profession," today "many would disavow it as improper." 41 The result, he says are manifold indications that the legal profession today is in a dire state.… [There are] [r]ampant fraudulent billing practices in law firms…. Lawyers were key facilitators in the massive corporate frauds that transpired in Enron, and in other corporate scandals. Lawyers … created and marketed illegal tax shelters. Lawyers at the respected Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel wrote the infamous 'torture memo,' twisting applicable law in an effort to authorize torture. 42 Tamanaha is also harshly critical of "cause litigation," which "involves lawyers instigating legal actions to obtain decisions that further the particular agenda they support."
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Lawyers at the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Ralph Nader's consumer advocacy litigation 39 Id. At 138. 40 Id. at 140. 41 Id. at 249. 42 Id. at 134. 43 Id. at 156.
group, the Children's Defense Fund, or Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice all manifest the corrupting influence of an instrumental conception of law free from the ethical constraints that lawyers owe to the public. 44 These litigation groups, says Tamanaha, threaten "to debase the notion of 'public interest'" since they "convey the impression that 'public interest' is whatever any particular group says it is."
45
There is a certain ambiguity in Tamanaha's articulation of lawyers' ethical obligations:
does he think that lawyers, being "'officers of the court' or 'handmaidens of the law,'" 46 owe a duty of fidelity to the law, whatever the law says; or does he think that they owe a duty to the Indeed, in such a cultural setting it seems natural that rules of professional conduct give priority to lawyers' duties to their clients' interests over their own ethical beliefs. not owe a duty to the "public interest," but rather that unpopular or even ostracized views of the "public interest" have a right to be heard. A professional bar protective of the "common good" may easily shut out of the legal system a variety of voices that should receive effective representation. This is especially true where, as in the case of the legal profession, members of the professional bar are primarily drawn from a socio-economic elite. Lawyers' fidelity to their clients' interests -rather than to their own opinions of where society's interests lie -is an expression of the wish to open the legal system to a variety of interests and opinions. Sure enough, not all opinions or interests are legitimate, but which are and which aren't should be decided only after effective representation has been rendered -not before. Today's lawyers may be less committed to the idea of a "common good" not because they are indoctrinated into an instrumental view of the law (as we saw above, that description has things backward), but because they live in openly pluralistic societies.
On the other hand, if Tamanaha's claim is that lawyers owe a duty not to the "common good" but to the law, whatever it says, and that instrumentalism undermines that duty, then his thesis runs into a different, and a more interesting, problem -indeed a problem that afflicts much jurisprudential writing. The question here becomes: why would an instrumental conception of law produce more lawyers presumably willing to distort the law and advance specious legal arguments, and more lawyers willing to transgress the law and collude in criminal fraud?
Tamanaha's answer, as I understand it, is essentially this: if the law is viewed not as an immutable essence of reason and justice but as mere means to the fulfillment of manifold (a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; (b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or (c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer' s ability to represent the client.
interests and ends, then legal requirements become uncertain and easily manipulable. And the more uncertain and manipulable legal requirements become, the more uncertain and manipulable becomes the line between honest lawyering and criminal or unscrupulous conduct -with the result that more and more lawyers find themselves on the wrong side of the divide. Indeed
Tamanaha goes so far as to contrast an attitude that "treats legal rules and processes in an unreservedly instrumental manner" with one that "accepts that law has binding content…that must be respected." 48 "In the practice of law," says Tamanaha, "there are [sic] a range of attitudes that shade from seeing the law as a set of binding dictates to be complied with to seeing law as a toll to be manipulated to achieve ends." 49 (Legal education, he adds, actually instructs students to "ignore the binding quality of law" by teaching them "to see both sides of a case" and argue accordingly: "Law is all about making arguments, is the message, and there is always some argument to be made." 50 ) Since an instrumental conception of law simply fails to respect the binding quality of the law, it is no surprise that it results in lawyers recommending illegal tax schemes, colluding in unlawful corporate transactions, and writing memos sanctioning torture. Proponents of an instrumental approach to law … have urged that judges … strive to achieve legislative purposes.... Sensible as this might be, this approach has detrimental consequences for the rule-bound nature of the system.… The fundamental tension between following rules and striving for purposes or ends cannot be eradicated because it strikes at the very meaning of a legal rule.… What makes a rule a "rule" is that it specifies in general terms in advance a mandate that decision-makers must follow to the exclusion of -screening out -any other considerations. This is so without regard to the purpose behind the rule or the consequences of the [sic] applying the rule.
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The Rule of Law, says Tamanaha, quoting Friedrich Hayek, means that the government "is bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand -rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances." 53 Taking into consideration the purposes behind legal rules conflicts with this ideal. He explains:
[T]here is no doubt that the task of achieving purposes or ends -which requires a judge to grapple with hard issues of value and social policy, and to determine likely future consequences -is more complicated, far more uncertain, and far less ascertainable than strictly applying legal rules to an existing situation. "trucks" clearly fall within the "core meaning" of the term "vehicles." The legal resolution of the case does not revolve around that "core meaning," but around the rule's purpose.
Mark Twain famously said that few things were harder to put up with than a good example. Hart must have felt the full force of this aphorism: Fuller's example struck right at the heart of his textualist thesis. As it came out, Hart chose to ignore this short but devastating critique, proceeding to publish his theory essentially unchanged in the much-celebrated The in the process made their theory an irrelevant academic peculiarity.
As for Tamanaha, his thesis is based on this by-and-large abandoned Hartian theory of legal interpretation. Tamanaha contrasts a "textualist" theory of legal interpretation with a "purpose-oriented" one (which he identifies with instrumentalism 67 ). 68 And he then claims that, unlike the purpose-oriented theory, the "textualist" theory actually respects the "bindingness" of legal rules ("a rule's … rigidity," writes Tamanaha, "derives from the language of the rule's formulation," and "what makes a rule a 'rule' is that it specifies in general terms in advance a mandate that decision-makers must follow to the exclusion of -screening out -any other considerations"). 69 Tamanaha adds that the choice between following legal rules and effecting their purposes is a "perennial one," a choice that judges always had to face and presumably always will (so that judges who decide to go with a rule's purposes rather than its text may not necessarily violate by almost all advocates of textualism. 72 ) But he seems to think that, under the influence of the non-instrumental view of the law, the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of purposes:
whereas in the past it was understood that "rules control, unless the outcome is absolutely absurd or impossibly outrageous (a high threshold rarely met)," today purposes are allowed to win over clear textual dictates in too many cases. To sum up , Tamanaha's thesis assumes a method of legal interpretation that disregards rules' purposes when applying them, and therefore a method that never governed actual judicial practice -as the positivists, who floated such a thesis in the 1950's, have realized long ago.
Taking the purposes of legal rules into account when applying them, often to the effect of ignoring textual dictates, is what judges do and always did, be they operating under the influence of a "non-instrumental" or an "instrumental" view of the law. Indeed privileging "legislative intent" over clear textual dictates has been shown to be common judicial practice at least as far 74 See, e.g., Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court, Judge Easterbrook of the Eighth Circuit, or the Michigan Supreme Court, whose textualist opinions have reached new heights of absurdity -indeed explicitly disavowing the "absurdity doctrine. back as the Fourteenth Century -that is, when the non-instrumental conception of law stood unchallenged.
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As a matter of fact, Tamanaha's entire association of a "non-instrumental" conception of law (which regards the content of law as fixed by forces beyond immediate human control) with a method of legal interpretation that disregards rules' purposes when applying them, is way too quick. After all, natural law theory (the paradigmatic non-instrumental conception) was deeply preoccupied with what it saw as the law's purposes (principally justice and virtue) -only it thought, unlike the instrumental conception, that those purposes descended from heaven.
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Quite simply, Tamanaha presents a false dichotomy when he contrasts a conception of law that regards the content of law as "given or predetermined" and "not entirely subjected to our individual or group whims or will" with one that regards law as a "means to an end."
IV LEGAL PRAGMATISM
Having argued that Tamanaha's thesis is misconceived, it should be interesting to examine Tamanaha's principal nemesis -Richard Posner's brand of legal pragmatism, which, shall soon see, Posner's theory is in fact no different than Tamanaha's: the two subscribe to practically identical understandings of law and legal interpretation.
Posner's thesis is that judges should decide cases pragmatically. 79 What does he mean by that? "A pragmatic judge," says Posner, "will be guided in his decision-making process by the goal of making the choice that will produce the best results. To do this the judge will have to do more than consult cases, statutes, regulations, constitutions, legal treatises, and other orthodox legal materials" -which the pragmatist judge regards "as [only] limited constraints on his freedom of decision." 80 The pragmatist judge will go beyond these "orthodox legal materials" to consider, inter alia, rules' purposes, social policies, and possible consequences. 81 Posner also asserts that "there isn't too much more to say to the pragmatic judge than make the most reasonable decision you can, all things considered."
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This may sound very different than Tamanaha's preferred method of legal interpretation; but one must remember that Posner is a polemicist, and his points are often made in a hyperbolic style that may not stand up to close scrutiny. In fact, Posner's own clarifications and qualifications to the statements above place him firmly within Tamanaha's camp. "A good pragmatic judge," elaborates Posner, "will try to weigh the good consequences of steady adherence to the rule-of-law virtues, which tug in favor of standing pat, against the bad consequences of failing to innovate when faced with disputes that the canonical texts and precedents are not well adopted to resolve." 83 He continues:
A systemic value that requires particular emphasis is the importance of preserving language as an effective medium of communication. Judges formerly were explicitly oriented toward strictly following the law, but they were never completely blind to ends. With the rise of instrumentalism [Posner' s included], judges are encouraged to strive to achieve purposes or ends, while paying attention to the legal rules. Both orientations consider rules and ends. The former approach makes it clear, however, that the rules control, unless the outcome is absolutely absurd or impossibly outrageous (a high threshold rarely met). The latter approach makes consideration of ends a routine matter, and thus always a threat to affect the application of the legal rules.
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Now it is true that Posner makes the contemplation of non-textual considerations "a routine matter," and yet Posner also believes that legal interpretation ordinarily follows authoritative texts. Moreover, Tamanaha, although he believes that legal interpretation should follow authoritative texts, also believes that it should not do so in extraordinary cases -which means that non-textual considerations need be examined in order to establish whether the case at hand is extraordinary. The disagreement between the two is slight indeed: at most, it is a dispute about the relative importance of going beyond textual requirements. For Tamanaha it is rarely necessary and a potential threat to our cherished values, while for Posner it is also rarely necessary but the only practical way with which to make legal decisions. This is certainly no major theoretical disagreement.
One more fundamental assumption unites Posner and Tamanaha: both believe that textual constraints are the only real constraints on judicial discretion; in their absence there is only naked judicial power that is no different than the power of legislators. For Tamanaha, as we saw, adjudication that is not text-bound is uncertain, unascertainable, and a threat to the Rule of Law. 90 Posner agrees. Explaining the workings of pragmatic adjudication, he says: "There is no 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 Id. at 229.
algorithm for striking the right balance between rule-of-law" (which, as we saw, Posner identifies with textualism) "and case-specific consequences. . ." -which is why, he adds, "there isn't too much more to say to the would-be pragmatic judge than make the most reasonable decision you can, all things considered." 91 Thus Posner thinks that "judges make up much of the law that they are purporting to be merely applying," and that "while the judiciary is institutionally and procedurally distinct from the other branches of government, it shares lawmaking power with the legislative branch." 92 Posner also readily concedes that "Pragmatism may tend to dissolve law into policy analysis," 93 and he thinks that there is no intrinsic or fundamental difference between how a judge approaches a legal problem and how a businessman approaches a problem of production or marketing… the list of considerations proper for judges to take into account in making decisions is not completely open-ended; but the same is true for businessmen. The same is true, for that matter, for politicians… 94 Both Tamanaha and Posner believe that when it comes down to limiting judicial discretion, in a way that prevents judges from acting as legislators and that respects the Rule of Law, only textualist adjudication can provide the goods: everything else boils down to judicial legislationto the continuation of politics by other means.
The problem with this view -and also the real (rather than the imagined) problem with
Posner's pragmatism -is that it stops just where serious legal theory begins. Posner rightly rejects strict textualism (very few people don't), but he wrongly believes that non-textualist legal interpretation conflicts with the values of the Rule of Law, and that its decision-making process is no different than that of politicians or business executives. In truth, legal interpretation 91 POSNER, supra note 81, at 64. 92 Id. at 61. 93 Id. at 63. 94 Id. at 73.
employs a methodology of reasoned and principled decision-making that greatly limits the sort of considerations that legal interpreters use.
Here is a small example, taken from constitutional adjudication -that is, from the area where legal interpretation is presumably the closest to political decision-making. As we shall soon see, the differences between the two are enormous.
In 1977, the members of a Neo-Nazi group sought to march through the Chicago suburb of Skokie. More than half of Skokie' s 70,000 residents were Jewish, and many were survivors, or family members of victims and survivors, of Hitler' s death camps. 95 The city sought to ban the Nazi march, passing some ordinances to that effect, and the matter ultimately landed in a federal district court. 96 Despite a clear declaration that the ideas sought to be propagated were "completely unacceptable to civilized society," 97 the court refused to allow the City to prohibit the march, finding that the ordinances -including one prohibiting the "dissemination of any materials…which promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so" -were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 98 The decision was affirmed by the 7 th Circuit -the very court on which Posner sits today. 99 The case is a neat demonstration of the profound differences between the decisionmaking of politicians or business leaders and that of judges. Simply put, the court decided as it did because it could identify no proper legal consideration that could justify a contrary result.
Unlike the considerations of politicians or business executives, legal considerations -the reasons for which a case is resolved as it is -need be principled, publically articulated, sufficiently concrete so as to explain their resolution, consistently applied, and they must respect the purpose of the applicable legal rule.
Legal interpretation must settle on the considerations it deems dispositive. Cases which are identical in all relevant respects cannot be resolved differently using different considerations:
a legal interpreter may not decide in one case that speech deemed harmful and false should nevertheless be protected by the First Amendment, and then, in another case, deny First Amendment protection to speech because it is deemed harmful and false. To be sure, legal interpreters may, and do, change course: a court may decide that, despite earlier decisions to the contrary, harmfulness and falseness do remove First Amendment protections. But such reversals must be done consciously, explicitly, and with the recognition that the reversal is, in principle, applicable to all -past, present, and future -similar cases.
Thus, if the court were to find the Nazi march unprotected by the First Amendment, it had either to articulate a principle distinguishing Nazi speech from, say, speech advocating communism in the 1920's or civil rights in the 1950's -both forms of speech that, under similar circumstances, would be protected under standing precedent; 100 or else announce a change of direction (assuming institutional competence to do so).
If the court opted to distinguish the case (rather than wholly revise standing doctrine), its distinguishing principle had to comply with certain criteria. First, the principle could not be excessively vague: since it accepted the authority of the precedents and did not seek to replace them (even as it limited their reach), its qualification to those precedents could not threaten to sweep their holdings within its ambit. (For example, it would not do to try and distinguish Nazi speech as "particularly reprehensible.") The principle also had to harmonize with the First Amendment -the constitutional provision it purported to elaborate. That Amendment embodies a policy decision which must not be contradicted by the principles governing its application. For example, the claim that Nazi speech should not be protected by the First Amendment because it is "deemed dangerous by the government" would fly in the face of the very purpose of the First Amendment, and therefore would not be a viable distinguishing principle.
So in order to allow the banning of Skokie's Nazi march the judges had to find that civil rights marchers in Alabama in 1950 could also be banned; or else they had to articulate a general principle distinguishing such protected speech from Nazi speech with sufficient clarity so as to leave the former reasonably protected, while also respecting the policy decision embodied in the First Amendment. This apparently they could not do. 101 Instead, the court held its nose and struck down the ordinance, giving the go-ahead to a march by vicious and detestable provocateurs. What politician or business executive would have reached a similar decision (unless, that is, she thinks like a constitutional lawyer)? Skokie's politicians and business leaders certainly didn't: they voted overwhelmingly to ban the march. This is unsurprising, since none of the constraints delineated above applies to the decision-making of politicians and business executives. First, politicians and business executives need not make principled decisions: they may decide matters without grounding them in any general principle. (Banning a neo-Nazi march would be a rather simple decision in that case.) The decisions of politicians and business executives, even if principled, need not be equally applicable to all similar cases: they may decide, for example, that falseness is sufficient ground for banning Nazi propaganda but not for banning Creationism (politicians and business executives can and do decide matters on a caseby-case basis, usually by reference to pragmatic and expedient considerations). Politicians and business executives need not even acquaint themselves with any of the considerations previously used by their own institutions in resolving similar issues (an obligation that is imposed on judges). Politicians and business executives need not publicize the reasons for their decisions (they may not want to expose those to public scrutiny); in fact, they need not articulate any reason at all for the decisions they make -and need not even have one: they may properly rely on intuitions, hunches, prejudices -whatever floats their boat.
Politicians and business executives make decisions in a way that is fundamentally different than that of judges, who are far more constrained in the considerations they use; and it is therefore unsurprising that judges often reach different results than politicians and business executives. The constraints delineated above are merely the most uncontroversial and elementary, but they are enough to show the patent absurdity of Posner's claims, and the halfbaked nature of his theory.
It is impossible to accuse a man who published dozens of books and hundreds of articles of intellectual laziness, but what else can be said of a theory resting content with the claim that "there isn't too much more to say [about legal decision-making] … than make the most reasonable decision"? 102 There is a lot to say about the peculiar form of legal decision-making, and its distinction from other institutional and non-institutional forms of decision-making; and saying it is the task of legal theory -a task that the true giants of the discipline, people like Lon
Fuller and Ronald Dworkin, understood and tried to tackle.
V CONCLUSION
There has been a shift, says Tamanaha, from a "non-instrumental" conception of law (one that views the law as the immanent manifestation of some natural order) to an "instrumental" one (one that views the law as a tool to be shaped at will), and that shift threatens to turn our law into "a pure instrument of coercive power"" 103 as in those "blighted societies in which power has its way with scant restraint, and the powerless have little protection."
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I doubt that the blighted societies to which Tamanaha alludes owe their misfortune to this or that conception of law (power usually has its way in these societies despite the law, not because of it); but at any event, Tamanaha's thesis is based on an anachronistic understanding of the "common good," and on a false and by-now abandoned theory of legal interpretation that insists that lawyers and judges must blindly follow legal rules without considering their underlying purposes or consequences. But legal interpretation is all about argument and debate and purposes and consequences -and has always been so, either openly, or behind formalistic shenanigans. This does not mean that legal rules are not "binding": they certainly are, but their "bindingness" consists in something far more complex than simply following their textual dictates.
The perseverance of textualist theories of legal interpretation is due both to their simplicity, and to their purported solution to the most vexing problem of modern legal theorythat of judicial discretion (or "judicial objectivity," as Tamanaha puts it 105 ). If legal interpretation consists in merely following textual dictates, then at least in those cases where the
